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1. Opening Statement

The purpose of this paper is to provide a broad framework within which national intelligence planning can be initiated. On the presumption that national intelligence is one of the principal factors upon which national security action is decided, the planning for such intelligence should proceed in a clear understanding of the national objective, and of the major circumstances affecting this objective. Accordingly, the United States objective and world position are treated in paragraphs 2 through 7 below, and are followed by a discussion of the related intelligence planning problem in the remaining paragraphs.

2. The US Objective

Regardless of the corollaries and qualifications attending a broad statement of this type, it can be assumed that the overall objective of the United States is approximately as follows:

The development of a world composed of free and cooperative nations, associated in an organization capable of maintaining peace and of continually improving the relationships and welfare of its members.

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Under "normal" circumstances, the United States would advance toward its objective primarily through the United Nations Organization and secondarily by the benevolent exercise of its wealth and power in situations which the United Nations Organization was not yet capable of handling.

3. The Obstacle

It is generally conceded that "normal" circumstances do not prevail in the existing world situation. A condition of abnormality persists because of the existence of a power complex inimical not only to the objective and very survival of the United States, but hostile as well to all other states which do not share its aims. The characteristics which distinguish this power complex, the USSR, and give it the stature of a dangerous threat are:

- a. Its existing strength
- b. Its propensity for growth

4. The Interim US Objectives

Instead of pursuing courses of action which, under normal circumstances, would bring about the realization of its overall objective, but which under existing abnormal circumstances are seen to be ineffective in the face of a formidable and dynamic foe, the United States must concentrate upon the following interim objectives, designed to overcome the chief obstacle to its overall objective:

- a. Arrest enemy growth
- b. Reduce existing enemy capabilities
- c. Alter enemy objectives

5. The Complementary Courses of Action

An unprecedented series of political, economic, and non-aggressive military commitments made by the US in the last few years has failed to reduce Soviet capabilities or to stop Soviet expansion. Persuasion and good example have not succeeded in altering the objectives of Soviet leaders. Self-imposed conditions on the use of armed force by the US confine its military power to self-defense, and to the fulfillment of ill-defined and hence uncertain international obligations. Under such circumstances, direct armed measures by the US against the USSR are possible only when the latter is ready to incite and repel them.

For these reasons, it appears that there remain to the US only three general and interdependent courses of action for attaining its interim objectives:

- a. Systematic prosecution of an offensive and dangerous "cold war", as opposed to the defensive and relatively safe "cold war" so far conducted.
- b. Tightening and clarification of the conditions under which the US will take punitive action against Soviet or Soviet-inspired aggressions.
- c. Preparation for the obligations and risks inherent in a and b above, including "hot war".

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6. The Existence and Implications of Polarity

Thus far in the discussion a concept of dualism has been apparent, with the United States seen as protagonist and the USSR as antagonist. However, the power and influence of either the United States or the USSR is so much greater than that of any other state or organized power complex that the concept of dualism, when placed in world perspective, becomes a concept of bi-polarity, in which the high military, economic, political, and ideological potentials of the two polar states cause an inevitable drift of the remaining states toward one or the other. The direction and speed of this drift are consequently matters of utmost concern to the United States and the USSR, secondary only to consideration of their innate and respective power positions in relation to each other.

Under these conditions the United States and the USSR, while each concentrating upon the other as the problem or danger of first magnitude, are at the same time constrained to attempt influencing or manipulating the rest of the world in such manner as to best serve their respective aims. (Objections to the exercise of such influence or manipulation by the United States stem from a misinterpretation of our overall objective, a prime corollary of which is United States leadership and initiative in guiding other nations toward their own best interests.)

In a very broad sense, therefore, the United States and the USSR are each confronted with two major external problems:

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- a. The forces of opposite polarization.
- b. The forces of weak, neutral, and uncertain polarization.

As far as the US is concerned, these two problems constitute a frame of reference within which the interim objectives to be attained and courses of action to be followed should be continuously surveyed.

7. Consequences for the United States

Certainly for the present, and apparently for the foreseeable future, the interim national objectives and the complementary national courses of action indicated in paragraphs 4 and 5 above, when surveyed in the light of this frame of reference, lead to the following conclusions, which become in effect, the principal determinants of US action:

- (a) That the US must, chiefly by the systematic prosecution of an offensive cold war, arrest the growth, reduce the capabilities, and alter the objectives of the forces polarized against it.
- (b) That the US must, while retaining and strengthening its existing allies, influence and manipulate, to its and their mutual advantage, the forces of weak, neutral, and uncertain polarization.
- (c) That the US must prepare itself and probable allies for engagement in partial or full-scale armed conflict.
- (d) That the US must, in accomplishing the foregoing, strive to maintain and create conditions compatible with its overall objective.

8. The Relationship to Intelligence Planning

On the premise that the broad responsibility of the national intelligence structure is to furnish intelligence which will assist the government of the United States in planning, implementing, and checking the effectiveness of its courses of action in the external world, and since these courses of action will be largely dictated by the conclusions or determinants derived just above, it follows that a consideration of national intelligence planning should originate with an examination of such conclusions.

9. Relative Priority

It is not conceivable that a strong and resolute power such as the USSR would be affected to any great extent by even the most savage "cold war", unless convinced that the US was militarily prepared for the consequences, and was supported in principle and in fact by a comprehensive array of sympathetic nations. For this reason, the preparation for armed conflict and the expansion of pro-US polarization are matters fully as important as the systematic prosecution of offensive "cold war". At the same time, there is no assurance that either the gathering of allies or the amassing of armaments, or both, by the US, would have a salutary effect upon the USSR, unless reinforced by the techniques of "cold war". This leads to the conclusion that the principal determinants of US action are all interdependent and equally compelling, and that they operate coordinately.

10. Nature of the Intelligence Planning Problem

It can now be said, in broad terms, that the national intelligence planning problem* consists in:

a. Deriving coordinately the full implications of the four principal determinants of US action, as listed in paragraph 7 above.

b. Translating the visualized intelligence requirements of these implications into plans for actual production of intelligence designed to assist those responsible for US courses of action.

11. The Need for Identifications

The derivation of intelligence implications from the principal determinants of US action depends, in the first place, on clear and continuing identifications and groupings of the forces of various degrees and kinds of polarization. Such identifications and groupings, which are obviously an intelligence responsibility, are not complete, at least for the forces of weak, neutral, and uncertain polarization. If brought to completion, these identifications and groupings would lead to "intelligible fields of study", which would be found most useful in guiding intelligence effort, production, and organization.

* Manifestly, planning can be done only for problems or situations which exist, or which can be foreseen. Emergency requirements and specific requests do not fall in this category, and will, as always, have to be met by the intelligence organization as they occur.

12. The Relationship with US Policy

The derivation of intelligence implications from the principal determinants of US action must also be continually related to established and tentative US security policies. Such policies provide information on the present and probable future development of national courses of action, and afford intelligence planners the opportunity to prepare for impending national problems, and to detect and report factors and developments which may warrant modifications of existing or creation of new national courses of action.

13. The Broad Phases of Intelligence Planning

The general nature of the national intelligence planning problem, indicated in paragraph 10, as affected not only by the problem of identifications but also by the existence and development of US security policies, suggests an approach to its solution along the following lines:

PHASE I

A definitive identification and classification of states, organizations, movements, and forces into groups, according to the nature and strength of their orientation in the bi-polar struggle between the US and the USSR.

PHASE II

(Note: This phase is suggested in the knowledge that the role of intelligence is to supply information on which decisions are based, and not to recommend decisions. Since

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such information, to be of value, must be supplied in advance of the decision-making process, and since, moreover, those making decisions have not developed the habit of long-range anticipation of intelligence needs, it is necessary for intelligence planners, from a combined knowledge of policy and the world situation, to anticipate and arrange to meet intelligence needs on their own initiative. The only way of anticipating realistically the need of another is to place oneself in his position. Therefore intelligence planners are obligated to examine the validity of current national security policies and the need for changes or additions thereto, but only to arrive at the intelligence implications of such a critical examination. These intelligence implications will give rise to estimates and reports which will not recommend alteration or creation of national security policies, but which will furnish, on time, pertinent information upon which decisions for changes or new national action can be based.) *End of not*

Critical examination of established and tentative US security policies in the light of the principal determinants of US action, and in the light of Phase I, to determine:

- (a) What security policies are of current validity.
- (b) What security policies are in need of modification.
- (c) What security policies are needed but non-existent.

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PHASE III

Derivation of national intelligence production requirements,
immediate, intermediate, and long-range, essential for:

- (a) Implementing and checking the effectiveness of
valid national security policies
- (b) Demonstrating the need for modifications of
existing national security policies.
- (c) Indicating and preparing new national security
policies.